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Russia's food  economy is  undergoing a fundamental  transi-
tion.  Rapid changes and adjustments are still taking place in 
the market and pricing systems, in the subsidies to output and 
input markets and  the  credit  market,  and  in  the  process  of 
privatization and other structural reforms.  These transforma-
tions  have  far-reaching  effects  on  domestic  supply  and 
demand .relationships.  And,  as  part of the  still  greater eco-
nomic changes taking place in the former planned economies 
of central  and  eastern  Europe,  these  transformations  may 
have extensive ramifications for international food markets. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
BEFORE REFORM 
In the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, agriculture 
functioned in an environment in which virtually every economic 
parameter was distorted in some way.  In  most cases,  prices 
(both  levels and  ratios),  interest rates,  and profitability were 
centrally administered and  existed  as  planned  norms rather 
than  as  indicators of scarCity  and  performance.  There was 
hardly  any  relationship between  world  and  domestic prices. 
There  was  no  realistic  exchange  rate.  The  economy  was 
closed except to other socialist economies. Domestic producers 
and buyers had no access to markets abroad, and the access 
of foreign  producers and  buyers to the Russian  market was 
restricted to government contracts. 
REFORMS ANDAGRICULTURETODAY 
General economic reform provided the framework forreforms 
in  the  agriculture sector.  The first stage of agrarian  reform 
aimed to create production units capable of operating under 
market conditions, by establishing the legal bases and incen' 
tives for private farming. To achieve this goal, the government 
introduced special measures for reorganizing collective farms 
(kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes) at the end  of 1991 
and beginning of 1992 and stipulated the mandatory reregis-
tration  of all  farms.  Each public farm was required to decide 
whether it would retain its old status as a public enterprise or 
become a private one (such as a joint stock company,  part-
nership, or cooperative). It was a formal step that initiated real 
adjustment. Of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in existence at 
the  beginning  of reregistration,  34  percent  opted  to retain 
their old status. 
The structural changes in  agriculture also included rapid 
growth  in  the  private  family  farm  sector,  consisting  of the 
household  plots  of rural  people,  private  farms,  and  dachas 
(private plots) of the urban population. It was this small-scale 
farming  sector rather than the large-scale farms that helped 
stabilize the  Russian food  economy after reforms  were initi-
ated.  From  1991  to 1994, small family farms made. a growing 
contribution to total agricultural output for all products, and by 
1994 these farms produced 89 percent of all potatoes, 68 per-
cent of all vegetables, 44 percent of all cattle and poultry, and 
40 percent of all milk. 
At present, Russian agriculture is in disarray as a result of 
the general economic decline and the incomplete restructuring 
of the agriculture sector. Agricultural production in  1994 was 
21  percent below that in  1991. Agriculture, however, was not 
declining as much as other sectors. Russia's gross domestic 
product in 1994 was estimated to have fallen 39 percent below 
that of 1991, with industrial production falling by 44 percent. 
FUTURE FOOD CONSUMPTION 
AND PRODUCTION TRENDS 
How will  the transformation  of the  Russian  economy  affect 
future levels of  food consumption and production? Will Russia 
continue to  be  a major net importer of food  commodities,  a 
marginal exporter, or even a significant exporter of food? The 
answer will be a function not only of trends in production but 
also of trends in demand, and domestic institutional issues will 
be  pivotal  for  both  of these.  Agricultural  trade  policy  and 
pressures for protection may significantly affect the outcome 
aswell. At this point, the transition process is far from finished. 
In view of the many uncertainties, the projection here is 
limited to an exploration of trends under alternative assump-
tions to the year 2005. Because of the multitude of micro- and 
macroeconomic factors  that  determine  production  and  con-
sumption trends, as well as the political and institutional uncer-
tainties, any attempt to make a specific prognosis or to extend 
projections to the year 2020 would hardly be meaningful. 
The future consumption scenarios, for instance, are built 
on  past trend  lines (1980 to  1993) and then  are  projected 
from 1994 onward on the basis of assumed economic growth 
(income growth)  and  realistic  income elasticities for  major 
food  commodities.  For the  income  growth  scenario,  it  is 
assumed  that  initially negative  economic growth will  con-
tinue into the second half of the 1990s, to be followed first by 
a bottoming out of economic development and then by posi-
tive economic growth. 
The production scenarios for meat and grain presented in 
Figures 1 and 2 portray two alternative extremes: a long-term 
trend  based on  the  period 1980-93, and  a short-term  trend 
based on the generally disappointing performance during the 
1989-93 transition period, though the decline is expected to 
gradually taper off. 
Taking the mean between these two extremes offers more 
realistic projections of the supply and trade of grain for 1995 
and 2000 (Table 1). A projection for 2005 somewhat optimisti-
cally returns to the 1995 level.  In a scenario that incorporates 
the  trends  in  consumption  of cereal  products and  feed  use 
as derived from projected consumption of meat and milk prod-
ucts,  Russia's  demand  for  cereal  imports  declines  in the 
future.  These  assumptions  do  not,  however,  suggest  that 
Russia will soon become a large net exporter of cereals. 
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Source:  Goskomstat;  "Data  on  the  Russian  Reform  in  the  Agricultural 
Sector," provided by the Institute for the Economy in Transition and 
the Centre_ of Economic Analysis (Moscow: 1995, unpublished). 
Figure 2-Production of grain, 1980-2005 
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Source:  Same as Figure 1. 
A LONG TRANSITION 
Given the structure of the grain balance, the developments in 
livestock feed utilization will be central to determining Russia's 
net trade in grain. Rapid improvement in the competitiveness 
of meat and  dairy production should  not be  assumed,  how-
ever. The production of these items has shifted Significantly to 
the  smallholder  sector.  Thus  far,  this  sector  has  received 
almost  no  institutional  support  such  as  credit  or extension 
services, and the agricultural research and rural transportation 
systems are not designed to meet the needs and .potentials of 
this sector. The small-scale farming sector partly depends on 
the  large-scale  farming  sector,  from  which  it  derives  some 
inputs and services, often  in an informal way. 
Much will depend on  how well incentives to increase agri-
cultural production are transmitted to the agriculture and food-
processing sector and on the opening up of interregional trade 
opportunities.  Production  incentives  remain  weak because of 
Table 1-Grain production, consumption, and net 
trade for Russia, 1993-2005 
Indicator  1993  1995'  2000'  200S' 
(niillion metric tons) 
Total grain production  99.094  90.000  84.000  90.000 
. Total domestic demand 
(use + losses)  106.125  95.467  90.201  90.496 
Grain used for feed and 
mixed feed productionb  58.534  49.722  44.750  44.750 
Grain used for seed  16.395  14.756  14.756  14.756 
Grain used for food  26.942  27.224  27.229  27.225 
Grain used for other 
industrial processing  2.578  2.341  2.185  2.341 
Losses
c  1.676  1.424  1.281  1.424 
Projected balanced  -7.031  -5.467  -6.201  -0.496 
Sources:  A.  Manellya,  "The  Dynamic  of  Output,  Imports,  Exports,  and 
Utilization  of Basic Food  Products  in  the CIS for  1985-94: The 
Balances of Some Food Products in the  Russian Federation for 
1992 and  1993" (Moscow:  Centre of Economic Analysis, 1995, 
unpublished),  27;  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the 
United  Nations,  Trade  Yearbook,  vol.  47  (Rome:  1993),  89; 
authors' calculations. 
aForecastfestimate. 
bNumber of cattle and pigs for 2000 and 2005 is assumed to be 10 percent 
below 1995 estimates. 
CLasses are calculated as a share of estimated production, based on 1993 
proportions. 
dlmport requirements and/or stock change. 
ineffective price information systems and high transaction costs 
in  the food  system.  The opportunities for domestic trade are 
currently limited, given the state of infrastructure, friction in the 
marketing system, and the increased regional segmentation of 
food  and  agricultural  policy as authority has shifted to the re-
gions  (oblasts).  It seems likely that instead  of stimulating the 
accelerated development of domestic food industries, the large 
metropolitan  areas,  such  as  Moscow and  SI.  Petersburg,  will 
become increasingly dependent on food imports. In these cities, 
where income distribution is increasingly skewed and people's 
time  for  food  preparation  is  short,  the  demand  for imported 
high-quality and convenience foods will rise. 
Russian agriculture will remain in transition for a long time. 
Risky labor and food markets and the inaccessibility of financ-
ing are causing the expansion of small-scale farming and the 
home production of food.  Managerial deficiencies and market 
imperfections are hindering a revitalization of  large-scale farm-
ing.  Certainly  the  potential  for  major  production  increases 
exists in  Russia,  as  well  as  in  some  other countries  of the 
former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. One 
need  not be  overly  optimistic to  assume that efficiency will 
improve and this potential will be realized over the long term. 
During the period covered by the projections given here, how-
ever,  institutional  ,constraints,  friction  in  finance,  land,  and 
labor markets, and limited infrastructure will probably prevent 
farmers  and  the  food-processing  sector  from  responding 
strongly to incentives and will continue to inhibit the efficiency 
and growth of  the Russian food economy. 
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